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Attorney Sanctions in Illinois Under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 137
Honorable George W. Timberlake* and Nancy Pionk**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will review recent Illinois case law interpreting at-
torney sanctions under amended section 2-611 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure' and suggest its continuing relevance under Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule 137.2 In 1986, the Illinois General As-
sembly amended section 2-611 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure. 3 The new and expanded section 2-611, patterned after
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, was aimed at reducing frivo-
lous litigation in Illinois.4 Amended section 2-611 required
mandatory sanctions on non-complying parties and their attor-
neys.5 On June 19, 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted rule
137,6 which is identical to section 2-611, with three exceptions: 1)
* Associate Judge, Circuit Court of Illinois, 2d Judicial Circuit; B.A., 1970; M.B.A.,
1977; J.D., 1977, University of Illinois.
** Associate, McBride, Baker & Coles, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1986, Eastern Michi-
gan University; J.D., 1989, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
2. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 137 (1989).
3. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
4. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (historical and
practice notes).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
6. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 137 (1989). The effective date
of rule 137 is August 1, 1989. Rule 137 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party con-
stitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other pa-
per; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person
1027
1028 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 20
rule 137 makes the imposition of sanctions discretionary rather
than mandatory; 2) rule 137 requires a trial judge to set forth spe-
cific reasons for a sanction in an order; and 3) unlike section 2-611,
rule 137 has no provisions regarding insurance companies. 7 Be-
cause the Illinois Supreme Court controls the rules of procedure in
Illinois courts, rule 137 preempts amended section 2-61 1.
The main focus of this Article will be on the substantial body of
case law that has developed under amended section 2-611. Because
the substance of rule 137 mirrors section 2-611 and the Illinois
Supreme Court has not indicated that cases interpreting section 2-
611 are no longer binding, this Article assumes that cases decided
under section 2-611 are still good law and can be applied to inter-
pret identical provisions under rule 137. This Article refers to sec-
tion 2-611 throughout, and notes any changes required under rule
137. Because Illinois courts have turned to federal cases interpret-
ing rule 11 for guidance under section 2-611,9 this Article will also
look to federal case law in the areas that Illinois courts have not
yet addressed. Practitioners and judges may want to review case
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney fee. All proceedings under this rule shall be
within and part of the civil action in which the pleading, motion or other paper
referred to has been filed, and no violation or alleged violation of this rule shall
give rise to a separate cause of action, or another cause of action within the civil
action in question, by, on behalf of or against any party to the civil action in
question, and by, on behalf of or against any attorney involved in the civil ac-
tion in question.
This rule shall apply to the State of Illinois or any agency of the State in the
same manner as any other party. Furthermore, where the litigation involves
review of a determination of an administrative agency, the court may include in
its award for expenses an amount to compensate a party for costs actually in-
curred by that party in contesting on the administrative level an allegation or
denial made by the State without reasonable cause and found to be untrue.
Where a sanction is imposed under this rule, the judge shall set forth with
specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judg-
ment order itself or in a separate written order.
Id.
7. Id.
8. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § I ("The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."). Under the constitution, the Illinois Supreme
Court possesses rule-making power to regulate trial procedure. People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d
268, 274, 412 N.E.2d 541, 544-45 (1980). While the legislature has the power to create
laws governing legal procedure, it cannot create statutes that unduly infringe upon the
inherent power of the judiciary. Id. Where a statute and a judicially promulgated rule
conflict, the rule prevails. Id.
9. See, e.g., Frisch Cont. Serv. v. Personnel Protection, 158 I11. App. 3d 218, 224, 511
N.E.2d 831, 835-36 (2d Dist. 1987).
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137
law under the prior section 2-611 depending on the circumstances
of the case. The cases interpreting prior versions of section 2-611
have a general continuing relevance and may be helpful in deter-
mining the type of sanctions available or the kinds of hearings that
can be held.
Despite the guidance provided by federal case law, Illinois
judges have been reluctant to impose sanctions under section 2-
611. Until recently, this reluctance may have been the result of the
paucity of Illinois decisions interpreting section 2-611. Trial judges
may have been confused as to which federal standards under rule
11 apply to Illinois attorney sanctions. Other trial judges may
have been unwilling to impose the mandatory sanctions under sec-
tion 2-611 given the broad duties it imposed on attorneys and their
clients. Judges may also be attempting to avoid the satellite litiga-
tion that rule 11 has spawned in the federal courts. This Article is
designed to provide guidance to judges and practitioners through
the substantial body of case law that has developed in the area of
attorney sanctions. Such a focus should provide a clearer under-
standing of Illinois' sanction rules and their breadth.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 137
Although rule 137 and its predecessors have been altered many
times, its purpose has always been to combat frivolous, false, or
baseless actions and prevent the harassment and expense that ac-
companies such actions. 10 Section 2-61 I's most recent amend-
ments greatly expanded the authority to sanction such misconduct.
Prior to 1976, sanctions were allowed only against parties for "un-
true allegations and denials," made without reasonable cause and
in bad faith.1 In 1976, the Illinois Legislature dropped the bad
faith requirement.' 2 In 1977, another amendment made the rule
applicable to state agencies and administrative hearings. 13
10. See Ready v. Ready, 33 Ill. App. 2d 145, 178 N.E.2d 650 (1st Dist. 1961). In
Ready, the court stated:
Section 41 is an attempt of the legislature to penalize the litigant who pleads
frivolous or false matters or brings a suit without any basis in law and thereby
puts the burden upon his opponent to expend money for an attorney to make a
defense against an untenable suit .... One of the purposes of Section 41 is to
prevent litigants being subjected to harassment by the bringing of actions
against them which in their nature are vexatious, based upon false statements,
or brought without any legal foundation.
Id. at 161-62, 178 N.E.2d at 658.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 41 (1955).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1975).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1979).
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Rule 137 tracks the newest amendments of section 2-611. Like
section 2-611, rule 137 applies to "every pleading, motion, and
other paper" and is directed toward attorneys as well as parties. 4
Likewise, a lawyer or unrepresented party must sign every plead-
ing, motion and other paper filed. 5 By this signature, the signer
certifies that he or she has read the pleading, motion, or other pa-
per, and that a "reasonable inquiry" into the facts and law was
made.' 6 In addition, the signer certifies that the pleading, motion,
or other paper is "well-grounded in fact," and is "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or a reversal of existing law."' 17 Finally, the attorney or party
certifies that the pleading, motion or other paper is not "interposed
for any improper purpose" such as harassment, unnecessary delay,
or increase of the cost of litigation.' 8 Courts are authorized to
strike a paper that is not signed unless an attorney or party
promptly signs it after the omission is pointed out. 9 Courts may
also impose an "appropriate sanction" on a signer or a represented
party, or both, for violations of these requirements.2"
In a significant depature from section 2-611 and federal rule 11,
rule 137 makes the imposition of sanctions discretionary rather
than mandatory. 2' The effect of this change may be to reduce the
number of sanctions imposed under rule 137, thereby avoiding sat-
ellite litigation. Rule 137 also requires a judge to specify the reason
for imposing a sanction in the judgment order or a separate written
order.22 Presumably, this change will provide a party with suffi-
cient notice of the violation and allow more thorough appellate re-
view of the sanction order. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court
excluded provisions concerning sanctions of insurance companies
that existed under amended section 2-611.23
14. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 137 (1989).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Finally, any person signing the paper, represented parties, the state, and its
agencies are subject to rule 137. Id. If the litigation involves administrative review,
courts may include in a sanction award compensation to a party for "costs actually in-
curred by that party in contesting on the administrative level an allegation or denial made
by the State without reasonable cause and found to be untrue." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Section 2-611 provided that if an attorney, who represents a party on behalf
of an insurance company, signed a pleading, and a insurance company had actual knowl-
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III. RETROACTIVITY AND TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS
Illinois appellate courts have held that section 2-611 is not retro-
active.24 In Ignarski v. Heublein,25 the Appellate Court for the
First District held that amended section 2-611 could not be applied
retroactively to conduct which occurred before the amendment's
effective date.26 The court stated that the amendment did not af-
fect a "mere change in an existing procedure or remedy" but rather
it created an obligation on the appellant law firm which previously
did not exist.27 Because rule 137 does not change any of the obliga-
tions of the parties or their attorneys, it should be retroactive
where the events occurred after the most recent amendment of sec-
tion 2-611.
Courts also have addressed the types of proceedings covered by
section 2-611. Courts have found that section 2-611 refers to civil
pleadings exclusively, 28 and that it is inapplicable to discovery
abuse, 9 an attorney's verified petition for reinstatement,3 ° criminal
edge of a violation of 2-611, then the company could also be sanctioned. Id. Illinois
courts never addressed this provision. Under rule 137, this provision no longer exists.
24. See Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School, 176 Ill. App. 3d 886, 897, 531
N.E.2d 941, 948 (1st Dist. 1988); Ignarski v. Heublein, 171 Ill. App. 3d 830, 835, 525
N.E.2d 995, 998 (1st Dist. 1988); Prevendar v. Thon, 166 Ill. App. 3d 30, 37-41, 518
N.E.2d 1374, 1380-82 (2d Dist. 1988). In Prevendar, the Appellate Court for the Second
District held that the trial court erred in applying amended section 2-611 retroactively
against the plaintiff's counsel because the statute imposed a new obligation upon the
attorney. Id. However, the court found that the obligations of the party were un-
changed, and applied amended section 2-611 to the plaintiffs. Id.
25. 171 Ill. App. 3d 830, 525 N.E.2d 995 (1st Dist. 1988).
26. Id. at 836, 525 N.E.2d at 999. The amendment became effective one day before
the entry of summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Id. at 833, 525 N.E.2d at 997.
27. Id. at 835, 525 N.E.2d at 998 (citing Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.,
122 Ill App. 3d 471, 474, 461 N.E.2d 567, 570 (1st Dist. 1984)). The Ignarski court
refused to apply the statute retroactively based on the following reasons: attorney liabil-
ity did not exist under the prior statute; the conduct giving rise to liability occurred
before the amendment's effective date; and the law firm could not have avoided or limited
its liability by taking any action after the effective date. Id. at 836, 525 N.E.2d at 999.
The court also rejected the conclusion that the amendment's purpose would be best
served by its retroactive application, noting that the legislation did not intend such an
application "as a necessary and unavoidable implication from its express terms despite
the absence of any language limiting it to a prospective application." Id. at 837, 525
N.E.2d at 999-1000.
28. People v. Hughes, 181 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305, 536 N.E.2d 71, 74 (2d Dist. 1989).
See also In re Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d 229, 246, 518 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (1987). In In re Mitan,
the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the plain language of section 2-611 "affords no
basis for its application in actions other than civil lawsuits." Id. at 245, 518 N.E.2d at
1007. In so reasoning, the court also pointed out that the term "civil action" was used
four times in section 2-611. Id.
29. Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill. v. Armstrong, 176 11. App. 3d 64, 71-72, 530
N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1st Dist. 1988). In Armstrong, the trial court assessed sanctions
against an attorney for allegedly obstructing the plaintiff's deposition. Id. The appellate
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cases,3' and oral misrepresentations.32  In Frisch Contracting
Service Co. v. Personnel Protection, Inc. ," the Appellate Court for
the Second District held that the term "other papers" in section 2-
611 applied to appellate briefs.34 In addition to adopting rule 137,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court also adopted rule 37535 which
concerns the failure to comply with appeals rules, frivolous ap-
peals, and corresponding sanctions. Hence, Frisch and other cases
interpreting sanctions on appeal are no longer good law.
IV. CONDUCT THAT CAN BE SANCTIONED
UNDER SECTION 2-611
A. Reasonable Inquiry into the Facts
Section 2-611 imposes a duty upon the attorney (or unrepre-
sented client) to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts which
support a legal claim or defense.36 In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Anderson,3 the Appellate Court for the First District embraced
the federal courts' position that a reasonable factual inquiry in-
court held that if the sanction was imposed for discovery abuse, it should have been
imposed under discovery provisions such as Supreme Court Rule 219, and not section 2-
611. Id. In so holding, the court noted that in the federal courts, "Federal Rule 11 was
not properly used to sanction conduct where other more specific rules apply." Id. (citing
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986)).
30. In re Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d. 229, 246, 518 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (1987). The court held
that section 2-611 neither authorized nor prohibited sanctions for false verified petitions
for reinstatement. Id. The court reasoned that reinstatement proceedings have a sui
generis status (neither civil nor criminal in nature.). Id. Despite the court's decision that
section 2-611 was expressly inapplicable, the court held that Mitan's attorney had a duty
to conduct an "objectively reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and law supporting
the petition not unlike the standard embodied in Federal Rule I 1 and section 2-61 1." Id.
at 247, 518 N.E.2d at 1008.
31. People v. Hughes, 181 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305, 536 N.E.2d 71, 74 (2d Dist. 1989).
32. International Amphitheater Co. v. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 Il. App.
3d 555, 573, 532 N.E.2d 493, 504 (1st Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 125 Ill. 2d 565, 537
N.E.2d 809 (1989). The court held that the statute "only pertains to writings." Id.
33. 158 Ill. App 3d 218, 511 N.E.2d 831 (2d Dist. 1987).
34. Id. at 224, 511 N.E.2d at 836. See also Ignarski v. Heublein, 171 Ill. App. 3d 830,
837, 525 N.E.2d 995, 998 (1st Dist. 1988). The Second District has indicated that the
Frisch decision is limited to cases in which sanctions are sought for misstatements of law
in an appellate brief, and that it does not authorize sanctions when it is contended that an
appeal is frivolous or without merit. See Wiley v. Howard, No. 2-88-0562, slip op. (Ill.
App. 2d Dist. Mar. 17, 1989); Holcomb State Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 2-
88-0006, slip op. (Ill. App. 2d Dist. Mar. 22, 1989); Darnall v. City of Monticello, 168 Ill.
App. 3d 552, 557, 522 N.E.2d 837, 840-41 (4th Dist. 1988). For further analysis of sec-
tion 2-611 sanctions at the appellate level, see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
35. ILL. S. CT. R. 375, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 375 (1989). See infra notes
156-61 and accompanying text.
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
37. 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 532 N.E.2d 595 (1st Dist. 1988).
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volves "an objective standard based upon the circumstances ex-
isting at the time the pleading or other legal paper was presented to
the court. ' 38  In applying this standard, the court affirmed sanc-
tions against the defendant and his counsel for failing to make a
reasonable inquiry into the defendant's position that he had not
defaulted on mortgage payments. 39  The court recognized other
factors that should be taken into account including: 1) the amount
of time available for investigation; 2) whether the attorney had to
rely on a client for information regarding the underlying facts; 3)
whether the filing was based on a plausible view of the law; and 4)
whether the attorney depended on forwarding counsel or another
member of the bar (for his investigation).'
Generally, the Chicago Title court noted that an attorney cannot
rely on the client's verbal statements if the client possesses addi-
tional information bearing on the facts, or when the information
can be ascertained from third parties. 4' The court stated that an
attorney should review objectively the information which a client
38. Id. at 623, 532 N.E.2d at 600 (citing Olivieri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nor. Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918 (1987);
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986)).
See also Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 11. App. 3d 574, 580, 529 N.E.2d 1086,
1090 (1st Dist. 1988).
39. Chicago Title, 177 Il1. App. 3d at 618, 532 N.E.2d at 597. The plaintiff filed for
sanctions arguing that the defendant made erroneous factual assertions in his answer to
the plaintiff's complaint and improperly opposed the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 620, 532 N.E.2d at 590. The defendant denied that he had defaulted on
the mortgage payments and expenses. Id. at 618, 532 N.E.2d at 597. The appellate court
held that neither the defendant nor his attorney had made a reasonable inquiry to support
the factual representations in the defendant's answer. Id. at 626, 532 N.E.2d at 602. The
appellate court dismissed the client's assertion that he properly denied the allegation
without providing documentary proof because this proof was in the hands of third parties
who were tenants. Id. at 625-26, 532 N.E.2d at 601-02. The court noted that there was
no indication in the record that it would have been difficult for the defendant to locate
these tenants before he filed his answer. Id. at 626, 532 N.E.2d at 602. Furthermore, the
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that if the defendant's attorney had objectively
assessed his client's inability to produce sufficient documents, the attorney would have
realized that the defendant was in default when he filed the response to the plaintiff's
discovery request. Id.
40. Id. at 623, 532 N.E.2d at 600 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. It, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199
(1983) (advisory committee notes)).
41. Id. at 624, 532 N.E.2d at 601. The court relied on several federal cases for these
and the following principles. See, e.g., Lebovitz v. Miller, 856 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir.
1988); Medical Emergency Serv. Ass'n v. Foulke, 844 F.2d 391, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1988);
Kamen v. AT&T Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1986); Albright v. Upjohn Co.,
788 F.2d 1217, 1220-22 (6th Cir. 1986); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Sys. Int'l
Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594, 596-99 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v.
Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Wold v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F.
Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983).
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submits to determine if the facts support the claim.42 Attorneys
must then investigate any important discrepancies, inconsistencies,
or gaps between the information and claim before filing.43 Also, an
attorney should investigate each allegation or denial. 44 Neverthe-
less, the court recognized that certainty about the facts is not re-
quired nor are the attorneys mandated to take steps that are not
cost-justified.45
In the specific case before it, the court stated that once the attor-
ney realized his client was in default, he had a duty to admit the
default in his client's response to summary judgment.46 The court
recognized that when new information is discovered that could
render a previous well-grounded pleading unfounded, section 2-
611 did not require the counsel to revise the previous pleadings.47
The court, however, stated that counsel "cannot simply remain
silent." 48
The court held that "once it appears that a prior factual allega-
tion is in error," the information must be brought "forthrightly to
the attention of the court and opposing counsel, at least in the next
available court filing." 49
The Appellate Court for the First District also has held that
when an attorney must rely almost exclusively on the client for the
facts of the case, then the client and not the attorney should be
sanctioned." In Washington v. Allstate Insurance Co., 5 1 the court
affirmed the trial court's award of sanctions against the plaintiffs
only.5 2 The plaintiffs argued that their trial counsel should have
42. Chicago Title, 177 I11. App. 3d at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 601.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court cited authority which indicated that the crucial question was
whether the attorney, through his investigation, acquired enough knowledge for him to
certify that a paper is well-grounded in fact. Id. at 624, 532 N.E.2d at 600-01 (citing
Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
186-87 (1985)).
46. Id. at 626, 532 N.E.2d at 602.
47. Id. (citing Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 709 F.2d
451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 627, 532 N.E.2d at 602. Whether rule 11 imposes a continuing obligation
with respect to pleadings previously filed is in dispute in federal courts. See ABA Section
of Litigation, Sanctions: Rule 11 & Other Powers, at 10 (1988).
50. Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 Iil. App. 3d 574, 580-81, 529 N.E.2d 1086,
1090 (1st Dist. 1988).
51. Id.
52. Id. In Washington, the plaintiffs sued the defendant, Allstate, for breach of con-
tract after Allstate denied their claim on an automobile insurance policy for the theft of
an automobile. Id. at 576, 529 N.E.2d at 1087. The defendant argued that the allega-
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been sanctioned for failure to make a reasonable inquiry into the
facts.5 3 In addition, the plaintiffs argued that their trial counsel
should share the defendant's costs which accrued after an amend-
ment to the complaint had been filed, as plaintiffs counsel had
drafted and signed that amendment.54 The appellate court upheld
the trial court and noted that under federal rule 11, when a motion
is unsupported by existing law, the attorney, not the client, is sanc-
tioned. 5 Conversely, in Washington, the trial court determined
the plaintiffs' complaint was unsupported by the facts, which were
known exclusively by the client.5 6 As such, the court concluded
that the clients, rather than the attorney, were the most appropri-
ate parties to sanction.5
No Illinois court has established a definite boundary line be-
tween a pre-filing inquiry that is sufficient and insufficient. The
lawyer must at least examine the documents that are relevant to
the factual allegations of the case. 8 In People v. King,59 the Appel-
late Court for the Fourth District upheld an award of sanctions
against an attorney for failure to make a reasonable inquiry into
the factual allegations contained in a petition to rescind a driver's
license suspension 60 . This petition was the second such petition
tions in the plaintiffs' complaint and amendment were made without reasonable cause.
Id. at 577, 529 N.E.2d at 1088. The allegations alleged to be false included plaintiffs'
ownership and acquisition of the automobile, plaintiffs' performance under their insur-
ance policy, and allegations that defendant vexatiously and unreasonably denied their
claim. Id. at 578-79, 529 N.E.2d at 1089. During the trial, the court granted the defend-
ant's motion in limine and would not allow any witness other than the plaintiffs' and the
defendant's agent to testify that they had seen or ridden in the vehicle. Id. at 578-79, 529
N.E.2d at 1088-89, The trial court subsequently found the plaintiffs' allegations to be
untrue and granted sanctions. Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that because the court
had barred the plaintiffs from presenting evidence of the veracity of the allegations, it was
unfair for the court to conclude that there were false allegations of fact. Id. The appel-
late court disagreed with the plaintiffs, reasoning that the trial court order limiting such
testimony did not stop plaintiffs from presenting a prima facie case through other evi-
dence. Id.
53. Id. at 579, 529 N.E.2d at 1089-90.
54. Id. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in assigning sanctions
against the plaintiffs only because the amendment in the complaint was only one of sev-
eral allegations on which defendant based its motion for sanctions. Id. at 580, 529
N.E.2d at 1090. The rest of the allegations, the court noted, were filed by former counsel
in 1983, when attorneys were not subject to amended section 2-611. Id.
55. Id. at 580-81, 529 N.E.2d at 1090.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., People v. King, 170 II1. App. 3d 409, 524 N.E.2d 723 (4th Dist. 1988).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 415-16, 524 N.E.2d at 726-27. The defendant had been charged with driv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Id. at 410, 524 N.E.2d at 724. The
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filed on behalf of the defendant. 6' The defendant alleged that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to suspend his license because he had
not been observed on a public way at the time he was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol.62 The petition also alleged
that the defendant's former counsel had a conflict of interest in
representing the defendant and negligently represented him.63
In a petition for sanctions, the State argued that in filing the
petition for rescission, the defendant's attorney failed to order a
transcript of the initial hearing to determine what evidence had
been presented about "whether defendant had operated a motor
vehicle on a public highway." 6 Furthermore, the sanctioned at-
torney failed to contact the client's former counsel regarding the
prior proceedings or any conflict of interest issues. 65 The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's findings that the attorney did not
make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case and that the
petition's allegations were not well grounded in fact nor warranted
by existing law.66
B. Reasonable Inquiry into the Law
Illinois courts have not established a clear standard for deter-
mining when an attorney has undertaken a good faith inquiry into
the law and whether an attorney's argument is warranted by ex-
isting law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law. Nonetheless, Illinois courts have held
that sanctions are not appropriate simply because a litigant's argu-
defendant's license was suspended after he submitted to a test which disclosed an alcohol
concentration of 0.25. Id. at 410-11, 524 N.E.2d at 724.
61. Id. at 411-12, 524 N.E.2d at 724-25. The client had previously filed a pro se
petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Id. At the initial hearing, the
defendant was represented by other counsel. Id. The defendant was denied rescission at
both hearings. Id.
62. Id. at 412, 524 N.E.2d at 725.
63. Id. The petition also alleged that the imposition of such a suspension was im-
proper, that it violated the defendant's constitutional rights, and was contrary to Illinois
law. Id. Following a hearing at which the attorney presented no evidence, the petition
was denied. Id.
64. Id. At the initial hearing, the arresting officer testified that he observed the de-
fendant driving on a public way. Id. The attorney did not order a copy of the transcripts
until the day before the hearing on the section 2-611 sanctions. Id. at 416, 524 N.E.2d at
727.
65. Id. The defendant's former counsel subsequently represented the arresting officer
in an unrelated matter after the hearing. Id. at 415-16, 524 N.E.2d at 727. If the attor-
ney had consulted prior counsel, he would have learned that the defendant's former coun-
sel had not met, seen, or represented the arresting officer until after the hearing. Id.
66. Id.
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ments are unavailing or unsuccessful.6 7 In addition, courts have
distinguished misstatements of the law from misapplication of the
law and have declined to award sanctions for the latter case.68
In Illinois, sanctions are appropriate when an attorney fails to
inquire into the essential elements of the claim, such as whether the
claim is time-barred by a statute of limitations.6 9 In Wren v. Fee-
ney,7° the Appellate Court for the Third District affirmed an award
of sanctions against the plaintiff for failure to make a reasonable
investigation into the law regarding the statute of limitations,
which barred plaintiff's medical malpractice claim.7' In dissent,
Justice Heiple argued that section 2-611 should be narrowly con-
strued to apply only to pleadings, and not to affirmative defenses
such as statutes of limitations.72
Those cases where Illinois -courts have declined to impose sanc-
tions also provide insight into the propriety of section 2-611 sanc-
tions for legal arguments. In Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority, 3
the Appellate Court for the First District declined to impose sanc-
tions for failure to make a reasonable inquiry into whether the Tort
Immunity Act applied to the Chicago Housing Authority
("CHA").74 The CHA sought sanctions, arguing that the plaintiff
made "wildly untrue misstatements and distortions of law" in its
brief "for no other reason than delay, embarrassment and sheer
obstinacy. '75  The appellate court held that while plaintiff's argu-
ments were unavailing, they could not be characterized as asser-
67. See Davis v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 176 Ill. App. 3d 976, 986, 531 N.E.2d 1018,
1025 (1st Dist. 1988); Prevendar v. Thon, 166 Ill. App. 3d 30, 41, 518 N.E.2d 1374, 1382
(2d Dist. 1988).
68. See Frisch, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 225, 511 N.E.2d at 836; International Amphithea-
ter Co. v. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 Ill. App. 3d 555, 573, 532 N.E.2d 493,
505 (lst Dist. 1988).
69. See Wren v. Feeney, 176 I1. App. 3d 364, 531 N.E.2d 155 (3d Dist. 1988).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 365, 531 N.E.2d at 155-56. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's attorney,
after reasonable inquiry, should have determined that any cause of action against the
doctor was barred. Id. at 365-66, 531 N.E.2d at 155-56.
72. Id. at 366-67, 531 N.E.2d at 156. Judge Heiple argued that the statute of limita-
tions is not at issue until raised by the defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss. Id.
Consequently, he argued, the plaintiff is not required to allege or plead facts which
demonstrate that the action was brought within the statute of limitations. Id. Therefore,
the plaintiff had the right to sue whether or not the statute of limitations had expired. Id.
73. 176 Il1. App. 3d 976, 531 N.E.2d 1018 (lst Dist. 1988).
74. Id. at 986, 531 N.E.2d at 1025. In Davis, a minor plaintiff sued the CHA for
injuries that allegedly resulted from the CHA's negligent maintenance of a playground.
Id. at 978, 531 N.E.2d at 1019. The CHA appealed an order vacating the dismissal of
plaintiffs' second amended complaint and granting leave to file a third amended com-
plaint. Id.
75. Id. at 986, 531 N.E.2d at 1024-25.
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tions of law for which there was "absolutely no support or that
they are otherwise interposed for an improper purpose."76
One Illinois court was unwilling to impose sanctions for failure
to make a reasonable inquiry into the law even when the cases cited
by counsel did not actually support their client's position or sup-
ported a different conclusion than the one advocated.17 In Ailcare,
Inc. v. Bork,78 the Appellate Court for the First District declined to
impose sanctions against a plaintiff for failure to make a reasonable
inquiry into the law surrounding defamation and commercial dis-
paragement. 79 The defendant argued that "even cursory research
would have revealed that the case did not involve commercial dis-
paragement, that there was no basis for injunctive relief and that
plaintiff could not proceed under the Consumer Fraud Act or the
Trade Practices Act." ' The court stated that the cases plaintiff
cited to support its theory that the alleged defamations disparaged
its business either did not support the plaintiff or, in fact, sup-
ported only the conclusion that those statements constituted defa-
mation."' Despite these deficiencies, the appellate court concluded
76. Id. at 986, 531 N.E.2d at 1025. The court failed to articulate specific reasons for
its holding. Id. The court noted that nothing in the cases cited by the plaintiff addressed
whether a housing authority may avail itself of section 3-106 immunity or supported
plaintiff's argument that the "holdings were based on a conclusion that the housing au-
thorities were engaged in non-governmental, proprietary functions." Id. at 980-81, 531
N.E.2d at 1021. The appellate court held that section 3-106 did apply to the CHA and
that plaintiff's argument that a housing authority performs merely proprietary, as op-
posed to essential, governmental functions was incorrect. Id. The court also stated that
plaintiff's argument "subtly, yet significantly" misconstrued the legislative intent behind
section 3-106. Id. at 982, 531 N.E.2d at 1022. Plaintiff's assertion that the CHA was a
"volunteer" was also meritless. Id. at 984-85, 531 N.E.2d at 1023-24.
77. Allcare, Inc. v. Bork, 176 I11. App. 3d 993, 531 N.E.2d 1033 (1st Dist. 1988).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1004, 531 N.E.2d at 1040. Allcare involved a medical supply company's
suit for injunctive relief, defamation, and deceptive trade practices against a competitor
who allegedly made defamatory statements about the plaintiff's president. Id. at 995-96,
531 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
80. Id. at 1003-04, 531 N.E.2d at 1040.
81. Id. at 999-1000, 531 N.E.2d at 1037. The court recognized that the plaintiff ig-
nored the defamation or disparagement tests cited in substantially similar cases. Id.
Hence, the plaintiff's argument that a statement could constitute both defamation and
commercial disparagement was held to be unavailing. Id. The defendant also sought to
recover costs incurred on appeal. Id. at 1004, 531 N.E.2d at 1040. The defendant
charged that the plaintiff relied on a stricken count of its complaint, "distorted holdings
of cases cited, and wilfully ignored binding and relevant authority." Id. On appeal, the
court held, among other things, that the plaintiff could not rely on those counts the trial
court ordered stricken. Id. at 998, 531 N.E.2d at 1036. The defendants had moved to
strike portions of plaintiff's brief citing to a count allegedly stricken by the trial court.
Id. at 997-98, 531 N.E.2d at 1035-36. The court found that the plaintiff ignored the trial
record which revealed that the count was indeed struck. Id. Because the plaintiff did not
appeal that part of the order striking that count, the court held the plaintiff could neither
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that plaintiff's arguments were "not so lacking a legal basis that
they warrant a finding of bad faith." 2 Therefore, the court denied
the motion for sanctions.83
C. Arguments for a Good-Faith Extension of the Law
No Illinois court has dealt with the issue of whether an attorney
must distinguish between arguments based on existing law and
those arguments made to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
However, the Seventh Circuit in Szabo Food Services, Inc. v. Can-
teen Corp. ,84 stated that the only way to determine whether a com-
plaint is an attempt to modify the law is to examine counsel's
arguments with care.85 The court noted that "[w]hen counsel rep-
resent that something clearly rejected by the Supreme Court is gov-
erning law, then it is appropriate to conclude that counsel are not
engaged in trying to change the law; counsel either are trying to
buffalo the court or have not done their homework. ' 86 The reason-
ing of the Szabo court supports the Wren decision because the stat-
ute of limitations argument was well-settled.87
Federal courts have held that a litigant is not required to charac-
terize his position as either warranted by existing law or as a good-
faith argument for the extension of the law in order to avoid sanc-
tions.88 This issue has not yet been litigated by the Illinois courts
but it is probable that they will follow the federal courts' lead.
D. Improper Purpose
Section 2-611 prohibits the filing of a paper that is brought for
improper purposes such as to harass, delay, or increase costs un-
necessarily. 89 No Illinois court has directly construed the "im-
proper purpose" language of section 2-611. If federal case
development is any indication, the "improper purpose" language of
rely on those allegations nor the amended count's allegations. Id. The court also distin-
guished or found unavailing many other cases the plaintiff had cited to support its case.
Id. at 1001-03, 531 N.E.2d at 1038-39.
82. Id. at 1004, 531 N.E.2d at 1040.
83. Id.
84. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
85. Id. at 1082.
86. Id.
87. Wren v. Feeney, 176 Ill. App. 3d 364, 531 N.E.2d 155 (3d Dist. 1988).
88. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th
Cir. 1986). But see Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 851 (1986).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
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section 2-611 will be used by litigants more frequently in the
future.
The federal courts usually apply a standard of objective reasona-
bleness to determine whether a paper is filed for an improper pur-
pose.90 Under the standard of objective reasonableness, the court
oan infer the purpose of the filing from the consequences that arise
from the pleading.9' For example, courts may infer an improper
purpose where the consequence of the motion is to delay the pro-
ceedings.92  Where reasonable preparation would have avoided
these consequences, an attorney can be sanctioned, even though
such delay was unintentional and the pleading was in good faith.93
Parties who file repetitive litigation may also be sanctioned under
the reasoning that the conduct showed a "penchant for harassing
defendants."94 Some commentators argue that regardless of the
objective standard under rule 11, analysis of a signer's "improper
purpose" will necessarily involve analysis of subjective intent be-
cause the motive of the signer will have to be determined. 95 It is
not clear how Illinois courts will rule on this issue.
V. THE INITIATION OF SANCTIONS
Section 2-611 does not address what procedure judges or liti-
gants should use to initiate sanctions.96 Illinois case law suggests
several procedural elements a litigant should follow.97 First, a re-
quest for sanctions must be raised by a petition which meets the
minimum standards of specificity. 98 The petition must state specif-
ically which statements were falsely made and what fees were in-
90. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
91. See Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. Id.
93. See Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986).
94. See Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1033 (1987).
95. See ABA Section of Litigation, Rule 11 and Other Powers, at 10 (1988); G. Jo-
SEPH, SANCTIONS, THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 180-81 (1989) (arguing
that this dispute is a matter of semantics because a court can only determine violations of
the improper purpose clause by inferring the signers' intent from their objective
behavior.)
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
97. See generally Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill. v. Armstrong, 176 Ill. App. 3d 64,
530 N.E.2d 1041 (1st Dist. 1988); Plainfield Community Consol. School Dist. v. Lindblad
Constr. Co., 174 Ill. App. 3d 149, 528 N.E.2d 996 (3d Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 124 I11.
2d 561, 535 N.E.2d 920 (1989); Geneva Hosp. Supply v. Sandberg, 172 I11. App. 3d 960,
527 N.E.2d 611 (2d Dist. 1988).
98. Diamond Mortgage, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 530 N.E.2d at 1045; Plainfield, 174 111.
App. 3d at 154-55, 528 N.E.2d at 999; Geneva Hosp., 172 Ill. App. 3d at 965-66, 527
N.E.2d at 614.
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curred as a result of such statements.99 If a movant argues that a
paper is not well-grounded in fact or law, the movant must point to
specific circumstances that support the argument.' °°
Specificity insures that the responding party has an opportunity
to challenge and defend against the allegations made, and assures
that the fees and costs can be fairly apportioned.'' A judge who
initiates sanctions should be required to meet these same standards
of specificity. Rule 137 imposes this requirement to a judge's deci-
sion to impose sanctions and requires that the court set forth the
reasons and bases for the sanctions in the judgment order or a sep-
arate written order. 102
In Geneva Hospital Supply, Inc. v. Sandberg,113 the Appellate
Court for the Second District affirmed the trial court's denial of
sanctions."4 In so affirming, the court noted the lack of specificity
in the movant's petition.° 5 The Geneva Hospital court stated that
in an appeal of a denial of sanctions based on lack of specificity, the
appellant must at least cite the portions of the record that support
its claim that the allegations were not well-grounded in fact. 10 6
In addition to the specificity requirement, the movant has the
burden of proving that fees, costs, or other sanctions are war-
ranted. 117 Generally, the proof is to be made at a separate eviden-
tiary hearing. 08 The movant should be allowed to present
testimony or evidence which proves the allegations. 109 In People v.
King, 110 the State sought sanctions against an attorney who filed a
petition to rescind his client's license suspension. I 'I The State
99. Plainfield, 174 Il1. App. 3d at 155, 528 N.E.2d at 999; Diamond Mortgage, 176 Ill.
App. 3d at 71, 530 N.E.2d at 1045.
100. Geneva Hosp., 172 I11. App. 3d at 967, 527 N.E.2d at 615.
101. Diamond Mortgage, 176 Il1. App. 3d at 71, 530 N.E.2d at 1045; Plainfield, 174
III. App. 3d at 154-55, 528 N.E.2d at 999; Geneva Hosp., 172 I11. App. 3d at 965-66, 527
N.E.2d at 614.
102. ILL. S. CT. R. 137, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 137 (1989)
103. 172 I11. App. 3d 960, 527 N.E.2d 611 (2d Dist. 1988).
104. Id. at 967, 527 N.E.2d at 615.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court noted that the appellant in the instant case cited only one portion
of the record in its brief and that even if its motion was sufficiently specific, it would not
have found that the appellant had established in its brief that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying sanctions. Id.
107. Geneva Hosp., 172 11. App. 3d at 966, 527 N.E.2d at 614; Diamond Mortgage,
176 Il1. App. 3d at 71, 530 N.E.2d at 1045.
108. See People v. King, 170 11. App. 3d 409, 415-16, 524 N.E.2d 723, 727 (4th Dist.
1988).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 412-13, 524 N.E.2d at 725.
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based part of its claim on the fact that the attorney had failed to
order and read a prior hearing transcript in which the arresting
officer's testimony directly contradicted the attorney's allegations
in the petition." 2 The State presented testimony from the arresting
officer and a court reporter who testified that the attorney did not
request a transcript of the prior hearing until the day before the
section 2-611 hearing.' 13
Not only must the plaintiff prove the need for sanctions, Illinois
decisions also suggest that Illinois courts must comport with the
essential elements of due process - including notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature
of the case." 4 There is general agreement that whether a hearing
will be required depends on the circumstances of the case." 5 No
hearing may be needed where the requirements for sanctions can
be proved or rebutted on the basis of pleadings or trial evidence. 
11 6
The gravity of the conduct and the sanction may also mandate a
hearing. ' 17
Only one Illinois court has dealt with the question of adequate
notice under the amended section 2-611. In Washington v. All-
state," 8 the plaintiffs claimed that they had a due process right to
receive notice of the amount of fees and costs which the defendant
sought under section 2-611.' 1 The court held that since the de-
fendant had served plaintiffs' trial counsel with notice of the sec-
tion 2-611 motion four days before the first hearing, and had return
receipts that indicated both plaintiffs had received letters apprising
them of the second hearing at least one month before the second
hearing, the notice was adequate to inform them that the court was
considering the question of sanctions. 2 0
112. Id.
113. Id. at 415-16, 524 N.E.2d at 727.
114. See Grover v. Commonwealth Condominium Ass'n, 76 Ill. App. 3d 500, 512,
349 N.E.2d 1273, 1282 (lst Dist. 1979) (pre-amendment case).
115. Grover, 76 I11. App. 3d at 512, 394 N.E.2d at 1282. See also Donaldson v. Clark,
819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
116. Grover, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 512, 394 N.E.2d at 1282. See also Brown v. National
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985).
117. See Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir.
1986). See also Diamond Mortgage, 176 I11. App. 3d at 71-72, 530 N.E.2d at 1045. In
Diamond Mortgage, the court vacated the trial court's award of attorney's fees on the
grounds that not only was it a sanction for discovery abuse, but also that the record did
not indicate how the fees were determined, no statement of fees was ever submitted, nor
was a hearing held as to the reasonableness of the fees. Id.
118. 175 Ill. App. 3d 574, 529 N.E.2d 1086 (1st Dist. 1988).
119. Id. at 581-82, 529 N.E.2d at 1091.
120. Id.
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VI. APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS
Illinois courts have held that sanctions must be reasonable. 2' In
Plainfield Community Consolidated School District v. Lindblad
Construction Co.,22 the court held that sanctions should be appor-
tioned in terms of the sanctioned conduct.' 23 Only that portion of
fees and costs attributable to the conduct should be assessed
against the party or attorney. 124  In Plainfield, the trial court
awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs based upon false state-
ments made in an arbitration proceeding and in subsequent trial
court proceedings. 125 The appellate court held that the portion of
the award that was given for fees incurred at the arbitration level
was improperly granted because section 2-611 did not authorize
fees for expenses incurred in an arbitration hearing that was later
reviewed by a trial court.126 Based upon this holding, the trial
judge must fit the sanction to the offending conduct and consider
the peculiar circumstances of each case. 27
When imposing sanctions, the court also should impose the least
severe sanction adequate to deter sanctioned conduct. 28 While at-
torney's fees are provided for under the statute, 29 federal courts
also have assessed sanctions, such as a public reprimand' 3 ° or a
fine. 13' Of course, the court may also strike the pleading or motion
if it is not promptly signed.' 32
Although the range of sanctions may vary, they can only be im-
posed on attorneys and parties. In Plainfield, the appellate court
reversed an award of sanctions against an individual who was not a
party to the proceedings, even though the individual originated the
121. Plainfield Community Consol. School Dist. v. Lindblad Constr. Co., 174 IlI.
App. 3d 149, 155, 528 N.E.2d, 996, 999 (3d Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 124 Il. 2d 561,
535 N.E.2d 920 (1989).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 153, 528 N.E.2d at 997.
126. Id. at 154-55, 528 N.E.2d at 999. The appellate court remanded the case back to
the trial court to so apportion. Id.
127. Federal courts also have considered several equitable factors in assessing the
appropriate sanction. Those factors include: The sanctioned person's assets; the insis-
tence of the sanctioned person in maintaining an unreasonable position; and the conduct
of the party seeking sanctions in protracting the litigation or "puffing" its fees. Brown v.
National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1986).
128. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
130. See In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. See Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1986).
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (1987).
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false statements attributable to the defendant.' 3 3
Finally, if a party or attorney is sanctioned under some other
rule for the same conduct, section 2-611 does not contemplate
awarding double damages. 3 4 In Boltz v. Estate of Bryant,'35 the
Appellate Court for the First District declined to award attorneys
fees under section 2-611 for the wrongful issuance of an injunction,
where fees were already awarded under section 11-110 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 3 6  The court concluded that the recovery
would be much the same under either rule. 37
VII. FINALITY AND APPEALABILITY
Despite the fact that amendments to section 2-611 deleted the
requirement that a motion for sanctions had to be made with in
thirty days of judgment or dismissal, case law is clear that petitions
must still be filed within thirty days.' 38 Moreover, section 2-611
petitions have been characterized as "post-trial motions."'' 39
Therefore, mailing the documents to the opposing party within the
time period does constitute filing the motion with the court." °
Illinois courts also have concluded that if a "2-611 claim is
timely filed, no appeal may be taken from the underlying judgment
absent a Rule 304(a) finding until the 2-611 claim is resolved." ''
133. Plainfield, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 155, 528 N.E.2d at 999. In Plainfield, the presi-
dent of one of the defendant companies had made false statements at the arbitration
hearing. Id. The court held that while the president may have been the "exclusive
source" of the statements for which attorneys fees were assessed, he was not subject to the
fees because he was not a party or attorney of record. Id.
134. Boltz v. Estate of Bryant, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 530 N.E.2d 985 (1st Dist.
1988).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1067, 530 N.E.2d at 992. Section 11-110 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 11-110 (1985), provided for recovery of damages for
wrongful issuance of an injunction. Boltz, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1061-62, 530 N.E.2d at 988.
137. Boltz, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1061-62, 530 N.E.2d at 988.
138. Herman v. Fitzgerald, No. 2-88-0376, slip op. at 6-10 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 23,
1989).
139. Id. In Herman v. Fitzgerald, the court based its conclusion on section 2-1203 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, where a party in a non-jury case may file certain motions
within 30 days after judgment is entered. Id. One of the motions contemplated by this
section is a motion "for other relief." Id. In addition, the court cited several cases in-
volving the prior section 2-611 in which such petitions were characterized a post-trial
motions. Id. Finally, the court noted the long standing rule that "a trial court loses
jurisdiction when, after thirty days, no post-trial motion has been filed." Id.
140. Id.
141. Palmisano v. Connell, 179 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1095, 534 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (2d
Dist. 1989). See also Kousins v. Anderson, No. 2-88-0764, slip op. (I1l. App. 2d Dist.
Apr. 12, 1989) (Because the 2-611 claim was timely filed, unresolved, and no rule 304(a)
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In Palmisano v. Connell, "'42 the Appellate Court for the Second
District held that 2-611 claims must now be considered part of the
civil action which gave rise to the claim and cannot be considered
separate actions.143 In Palmisano, the plaintiff appealed an order
dismissing a contract action for unpaid medical bills. 14" The plain-
tiff filed her appeal within thirty days of the denial of her post-trial
motion regarding the court's section 2-611 judgment. 145 The de-
fendant contended that plaintiff's appeal was untimely.146 How-
ever, the appellate court agreed with the plaintiff that there was no
final judgment until the court disposed of defendants' 2-611 motion
(which occurred after the complaint's dismissal). 147 Therefore, the
court held that the plaintiff's appeal was timely.1 48
In Ignarski v. Heublin, 149 the Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict addressed whether a law firm has standing to appeal an award
of sanctions when it was not a party to the lawsuit. 5 ° In Ignarski,
the trial court awarded attorneys fee's against a law firm in a per-
sonal injury action.' 5 ' The appellate court held that the law firm
had standing because it was evident that the "judgment interest
against the appellant directly affected a pecuniary interest and that
this interest appears in the record on appeal."'' 52
finding existed, the plaintiff's appeal regarding her complaint's dismissal was dismissed);
Johnson v. Field, No. 2-88-0781, slip op. (I1l. App. 2d Dist. Mar. 27, 1989).
Supreme Court Rule 304(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 304(a) (1987), provides
for appeals from final judgments that do not dispose of the entire proceeding. An appeal
can only be made in such circumstances where the court makes a special finding that
there is no just reason for delaying enforcement of the appeal. Id.
142. 179 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1095, 534 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (2d Dist. 1989).
143. Id. But see People v. King, 170 II1. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 524 N.E.2d 723, 728
(4th Dist. 1988) (section 2-611 claim was brought as a separate action, thus making initial
claim appealable).
144. Palmisano, 179 I11. App. 3d at 1091, 534 N.E.2d at 1244.
145. Id. at 1095, 534 N.E.2d at 1247.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 171 Ill. App. 3d 830, 525 N.E.2d 995 (1st Dist. 1988).
150. Id. at 833, 525 N.E.2d at 997.
151. Id. at 832-33, 525 N.E.2d at 996. The case does not disclose why attorney's fees
were awarded against the law firm. However, the court declined to retroactively apply
amended section 2-611 to the law firm. Id. at 836, 525 N.E.2d at 999. Ignarski is distin-
guishable from the facts in Plainfield, in which the person sanctioned was neither a party
nor an attorney of record. For further discussion, see supra note 133 and accompanying
text.
152. Ignarski, 171 I11. App. 3d at 833, 525 N.E.2d at 997. The court recognized that
to bring an appeal, a non-party must have a direct, substantial, and immediate interest
which would be prejudiced by judgment or benefitted by reversal. Id. In addition, the
interest must appear on record or be alleged in the arguments for reversal. Id.
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VIII. APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND REVIEW
The imposition of sanctions under rule 137 is subject to an abuse
of discretion standard. 153  In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ander-
son, ' the court noted that the federal circuits are in conflict over
the proper standard of review, but concluded that because none of
the parties argued that the court should adopt a particular federal
standard, it would adhere to Illinois precedent. 55 In light of this
holding, a litigant may argue for a different standard.
On June 19, 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court also adopted rule
375 . 56 Rule 375 is intended to cover those situations where a
party, his attorney, or both fail to comply with the appellate rules,
153. See Allstate, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 576-77, 529 N.E.2d at 1088; Geneva Hosp., 172
Ill. App. 3d at 966, 527 N.E.2d at 614; Chicago Title, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 625, 532 N.E.2d
at 601.
154. 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 532 N.E.2d 595 (1st Dist. 1988).
155. Id. at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 601.
156. ILL. S. CT. R. 375, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 375 (1989). Supreme Court
Rule 375 provides as follows:
(a) Failure to Comply with Appeals Rules. If after reasonable notice and an
opportunity to respond, a party or an attorney for a party or parties is deter-
mined to have wilfully failed to comply with the appeal rules, appropriate sanc-
tions may be imposed upon such a party or attorney for the failure to comply
with these rules. Appropriate sanctions for violations of this section may in-
clude an order that a party be barred from presenting a claim or defense relating
to any issue to which refusal or failure to comply with the rules relates, or that
judgment be entered on that issue as to the other party, or that a dismissal of a
party's appeal as to that issue be entered, or that any portion of a party's brief
relating to that issue be stricken. Additionally, sanctions involving an order to
pay a fine, where appropriate, may also be ordered against any party or attorney
for a party or parties.
(b) Appeal Not Taken in Good Faith; Frivolous Appeals. If, after considera-
tion of an appeal, it is determined that the appeal itself is frivolous, or that an
appeal was not taken in good faith, for an improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, or the
manner of prosecuting the appeal is for such purpose, an appropriate sanction
may be imposed upon any party or the attorney or attorneys of the party or
parties. An appeal will be deemed frivolous where it is not reasonably well
grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. An appeal will be
deemed to have been taken or prosecuted for an improper purpose where the
primary purpose of the appeal is to delay, harass, or cause needless expense.
Appropriate sanctions for violation of this section may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties damages, the reasonable costs of the appeal,
and any other expenses necessarily incurred by the filing of the appeal, includ-
ing reasonable attorney fees.
A reviewing court may impose a sanction upon a party or an attorney for a
party upon the motion of another party or parties, or on the reviewing court's
own initiative where the court deems it appropriate. If the reviewing court initi-
ates the sanction, it shall require the party or attorney, or both, to show cause
why such a sanction should not be imposed before imposing the sanction.
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make a frivolous appeal, or conduct the appeal in a frivolous man-
ner.5 7 Under rule 375, an appellate court has the discretion to
impose sanctions for any of the above violations.5 8 The language
regarding frivolous appeals is a modified version of federal rule 11
and is also partially derived from rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.' 59 Rule 375 may resolve the current Illinois
courts' dispute regarding whether appellate courts have jurisdic-
tion and authority to award sanctions."6 Finally, some federal
courts have held that an attorney is obligated to file an appellate
brief that complies with rule 11, despite rules specifically governing
appellate procedure for sanctions. 6' Rule 375 is unclear as to
whether courts can use rule 137 and rule 375 interchangeably.
IX. SUGGESTIONS FOR RESTRAINT
Illinois case law interpreting the substance of rule 137 is grow-
ing, along with the number of trial courts that impose sanctions.
Many trial judges, however, continue to express a reluctance to
impose sanctions, particularly for deficiencies in legal arguments.
Some judges fear that attorneys will mount campaigns against
Where a sanction is imposed, the reviewing court will set forth the reasons and
basis for the sanction in its opinion or in a separate written order.
Id.
157. Id. (committee comments).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Prior to rule 375, there was some dispute as to whether an appellate court could
entertain section 2-611 motions itself. See In re Marriage of Stockton, 169 Ill. App. 3d
318, 328-29, 523 N.E.2d 573, 580-81 (4th Dist. 1988) (court held it did not have the
jurisdiction or authority to award attorneys fees absent a supreme court rule granting
such authority); Wiley v. Howard, No. 2-88-0562, slip op. (I11. App. 2d Dist. Mar. 17,
1989) (court has no authority to issue sanctions for frivolous or meritless appeals). Ac-
cord Darnell v. City of Monticello, 168 III. App. 3d 552, 557, 522 N.E.2d 837, 840-41
(4th Dist. 1988); Holcomb State Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 2-88-0006, slip
op. (I11. App. 2d Dist. Mar. 22, 1989); but see Ignarski, 171 I11. App. 3d at 837-38, 525
N.E.2d at 1000 (court considered 2-611 motion directly on appeal, holding that appellant
had not made assertions of law without support); In re County Collector, 175 I11. App. 3d
985, 988, 530 N.E.2d 598, 600 (2d Dist. 1988) (court considered motion but declined to
find that defendant's appeal was a needless extension of a baseless defense because the
plaintiff waived the issue in the trial court); Frisch, 158 I11. App. 3d at 224-25, 511 N.E.2d
at 836 (court could consider sanctions for misstatements of law in an appellate brief).
161. See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986). The federal courts utilize Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which pro-
vides for an award of "just damages and single or double costs" if it determines that an
appeal is "frivolous." See FED. R. App. P. 38. The court is not limited to rule 38, and
may in appropriate circumstances impose sanctions under other authority including Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Practicing Law Institute, Rule 11 and Other Sanctions,
New Issues in Federal Litigation, at 125-26 (1987) (citing United States v. Carley, 783
F.2d 341, 344 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986)).
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them during retention elections. No proof exists to verify these
fears, but they are often repeated at judicial gatherings. On the
other hand, the trial bar is critical of baseless actions which require
expensive defenses. Clients are especially vexed by legal costs in-
curred because of unjustified suits or pleadings.
Despite the development of the case law surrounding attorney
sanctions, the authors suggest that judges exercise restraint in sanc-
tion proceedings. Indeed, by making rule 137 discretionary rather
than mandatory, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have had this
same concern in mind. One reason for restraint is intensely per-
sonal. Before sanctions are imposed, a judge must find a deficiency
in that attorney's competence, diligence, or honesty. Such a char-
acterization can seriously impair the cooperation and trust which
allow the courts to function efficiently, particularly in rural por-
tions of the state.
Political realties also dictate caution among Illinois judges when
imposing sanctions. Judges who must run for election and reten-
tion seriously weigh the consequences to all parties, including the
judge, when asked to punish behavior that until recently was re-
garded as zealous advocacy.
Finally, judges should use caution when imposing sanctions
against the young, the elderly, and the truly incompetent.
Although individual cases filed by these practitioners may warrant
sanctions, the statute is not really aimed at them. Judges should
assist the inexperienced attorney whenever possible. Similarly,
many of the members of the bench feel a respectful duty to allow
some variance from currently accepted standards for older practi-
tioners. For violations by the very young and the very old, the
courts should consider sanctions such as continuing legal educa-
tion or attendance in court to observe standards of good practice.
Truly incompetent lawyers need to be removed from the profes-
sion - not repeatedly punished. The incompetent attorney should
be referred to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion. Parties appearing pro se should be given greater latitude with
respect to sanctions and judges should read their pleadings liber-
ally. 6 2 Rule 137 should be reserved for dishonest litigants, lazy or
careless attorneys, and the dilettantes of trial practice.
162. See Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. The Legal System, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
999 (1989).
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X. CONCLUSION
With the advent of rule 137, the discretion of the trial judge has
become central to determining the appropriateness of attorney
sanctions. Therefore, judges must exert care and clarity when im-
posing sanctions. The new requirement that the trial judges make
a complete record in rule 137 will ensure more probing appellate
review and thereby provide more guidance to the practitioner and
the judge. While the case law outlined in this Article provides a
starting point for analysis of rule 137, judges should consider not
only the legal, but also the practical issues involved in imposing
attorney sanctions. By considering both the law and its effect,
judges will better effectuate the purposes underlying Illinois attor-
ney sanction rules and improve advocacy.

